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 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INCLUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE WORKHOUSE SYSTEM 
 BY 
 COSMA  ORSI 
 The aim of this article is to describe the rise and fall of the workhouse system in 
connection with the developments that took place in economic thought in the tran-
sition from mercantilism to the Classical tradition. By examining the economic 
debate about wages, effi ciency, labor market, workers’ mobility, and unemploy-
ment, we discuss whether the social policy shift epitomized by institutional reforms 
like the Gilbert Act (1782), the Rose Act (1793), and the Speenhamland system 
(1795) was accompanied and eventually inspired by a change in the perception 
of major political economy issues. In doing so, we review the writings of Jacob 
Vanderlint (d. 1740), George Berkeley (1685–1753), Malachy Postlethwayt 
(1707?–1767), Josiah Tucker (1713–1799), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam 
Smith (1723-1790), among others. Although a direct infl uence by these writers 
cannot be proven, the originality of the present work rests on the effort to put into 
perspective the arguments elaborated by economic thinkers and the proposals 
made by social reformers so as to identify possible connections between economic 
theorizing and social legislation. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The aim of this article is to describe the rise and fall of the workhouse system in con-
nection with the developments that took place in economic thought in the transition 
from mercantilism to the Classical tradition. From the Gilbert Act of 1782 to the estab-
lishment of the New Poor Law (1834), English social legislation shifted from a safety 
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net devised to deal with emergencies to a social security system implemented to cope 
with the threat of unemployment and poverty at any point in time over a worker’s life 
cycle. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, England had to deal with the 
speed of the parliamentary enclosure process, fear induced by the French Revolution, 
the subsequent Napoleonic wars, and a series of economic crises that, by the 1790s, 
threatened to slash the social fabric at its core. In a period marked by growing 
inequality (Kuznets  1966 , p. 217), the call for public policies on behalf of the poor 
increased. It was thanks to this legislative effort that the late eighteenth-century English 
society came to consider the poor as “an integral part of local society, rather than a 
collective body of others” (King  2000 , p. 53). 
 Social and economic historians have provided different explanations for this shift. 
Many commentators on the Old Poor Law argue that the workhouse system achieved 
dismal results (Webb and Webb 1927–29, p. 223; Marshall  1956 , pp. 153–154; Poynter 
 1969 , p. 16). Its management was poor and often corrupt; it was diffi cult to fi nd appro-
priate employment for inmates with little work experience. When offered, incentives 
were too meager to be effective. Physical punishment, a poor diet, and gender segre-
gation were part of the parcel. Under these conditions, neither moral regeneration nor 
a positive attitude toward labor could be imparted. 
 Other scholars described the policy switch as an “emergency response to the 
extremely high food prices which began in the 1760s and stretched until the end of the 
century, which caused real wages in rural areas to fall temporarily below subsistence” 
levels (Boyer  1990 , p. 2). For the neo-traditional scholars, the shift from indoor to 
outdoor relief was caused by “the economic collapse of the economic position of the 
rural labourer” (Hammond and Hammond [1911] 1929, pp. 120, 123, 170; Webb and 
Webb 1927–29, p. 419). From still another perspective, Mark Blaug claimed that “out-
door relief was used to supplement ‘substandard’ wage rates and to support seasonally 
and structurally unemployed workers” (Blaug  1963 , p. 171). Some scholars explain 
this shift as the culmination of a process, matured throughout the century, leading to a 
more benevolent attitude toward the poor and their living conditions (Marshall  1956 ; 
Coats  1958 ,  1960 ; Cowherd  1960 ,  1977 ; Himmelfarb  1984 ). However, Peter Mandler 
disagreed, maintaining that the general hostility toward the poor was due to the unsym-
pathetic sentiments of property owners and greedy farmers alike (Mandler  1987 , p. 134). 
 Such an array of different, even contrasting, claims calls for further analysis of a 
period that has been somewhat neglected as a result of the far-reaching shadow cast on 
the period by the  Poor Law Commissioners Report of 1834 , which led to the New Poor 
Law (1834). It should be stated from the outset that, on the grounds of the literature 
here reviewed, any attempt to prove the existence of a direct infl uence of economic 
thought on social policy is doomed to fail. The economic thinkers discussed in the 
following analysis, in fact, did not hold civil service positions that could have directly 
affected policy decisions leading to the transformation of the English social legisla-
tion. Yet, a thorough examination of the most debated issues of the time, such as wage 
rates, labor market, workers’ mobility, and unemployment, might offer a broader and 
insightful perspective on the historical and cultural context in which the above-
mentioned reforms were formulated, approved, and implemented. 
 This paper is structured as follows:  section II introduces the main tenets of the 
 utility of the poor doctrine and the early arguments expounded by authors like John 
Bellers (1654–1725), Daniel Defoe (1660–1731), and Laurence Braddon (d. 1724), 
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who highlighted the workhouses’ shortcomings.  Section III analyzes the emergence of 
a renewed approach to economic development, which entailed improving the living 
conditions of the low ranks of society. In doing so, we consider the refl ections of 
Jacob Vanderlint (d. 1740), George Berkeley (1685–1753), Malachy Postlethwayt 
(1707?–1767), Josiah Tucker (1713–1799), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam 
Smith (1723–1790), who carved out a set of arguments that led to a different under-
standing of poverty.  Section IV evaluates the congruence of the above authors’ ideas 
with the institutional changes on poor relief: the Gilbert Act (1782), the Rose Act 
(1793), the introduction of the Speenhamland system (1795), and proposals by Samuel 
Whitbread (1764–1815) to implement a minimum wage (1795) and by William Pitt 
(1759–1806) to increase labor-force mobility (1796).  Section V looks at the emer-
gence of Friendly Societies as a new policy approach toward poverty and its relief. 
 Section VI pulls together a few fi nal considerations. 
 II.  WORKHOUSES: THE ECONOMIST’S POINT OF VIEW 
 The Elizabethan Old Poor Law (1601) provided assistance to a considerable number 
of poor people through a combination of indoor and outdoor reliefs (Ashby  1912 , 
p. 155; Hampson  1934 , p. 37; Oxley  1969 , pp. 27–28; Knot 1986; Boyer  1990 ; Taylor 
 1991 ), with the former gradually gaining priority over the latter.  1  By the mid-seventeenth 
century, an embryonic national workhouses system was established with the intent to 
both lower the burden of assistance and make the poor contribute to the country’s wel-
fare.  2  This shift in attitude was infl uenced by economic thinkers and social reformers 
alike, who “saw a need for a planned and organized commercial strategy to generate 
wealth based mainly on manufacturing” (Ivison  1997 , p. 123). From the 1680s to the 
1750s, the attempt at establishing a nationwide workhouse system was reinforced by 
an abundant pamphlet literature integrating social concern, repressive attitudes, and 
anti-poor prejudices with political and economic arguments. Notably, mercantilist 
authors contributed to the stream of thought concerning poverty, work, and the promo-
tion of national prosperity. Detailed plans for workhouses were put forth by, among 
others, writers like Joshua Child (1688), Richard Haines (1764, 1781), Thomas Firmin 
(1678, 1781), Matthew Hale (1683), Richard Dunning (1681), John Cary (1695, 1700), 
John Locke (1697), Charles Davenant (1699), John Bellers (1695, 1714), Laurence 
Braddon (1717), Matthew Marryott (1725), William Hay (1735, 1751), Thomas 
Alcock (1752), and Henry Fielding (1751, 1753). In a context where growth in 
 
1
 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the poor were those “without income from property or 
profession and, therefore, dependent upon their manual labour for living” (Cowherd  1977 , pp. 1–2). For its 
scope, scale, uniformity, and comprehensiveness, the Elizabethan system of poor relief was a  unicum in 
Europe (van Leeuwen 1994; Solar  1995 , p. 2; Patriquin  2007 , p. 2). 
 
2
 From the mid-seventeenth century onward, the increase of the Poor Rates between 1685 and 1701 was a 
problem addressed by many authors. Davenant (1696) set the expenditure for poor relief during the last 
year of Charles II’s reign to a total of £665,362, an amount similar to that claimed by Gregory King in 
1688: namely, £622,000 (King 1688, p. 31). During the eighteenth century, Henry Fielding declared that 
the amount of the rates had reached one million (Fielding 1753, p. 12). By 1787, the total sum paid for poor 
relief in England and Wales reached nearly two million (Marshall 1926, p. 77; Purdy  1860 , p. 287). 
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manufacturing represented the main vehicle for increasing national wealth, work-
houses were intended to help in expanding production. 
 Workhouses became a nationwide system from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. In 1711, Parliament approved the establishment of a new workhouse in 
Norwich; in 1714, the counties of Olney, Witham, Chelmsford, Essex, and Berkshire 
founded their workhouses, and, after 1718, local communities in the East Midlands 
followed the same route (Nicholls  1854 , p. 373, Hitchcock  1985 , p. 37). The Workhouse 
Test Act, passed by Parliament in 1723, expanded the process. This piece of legislation 
legitimized one of the most odious practices put in place to extract profi t from the poor 
(privately contracting them out—better known as “farming”), with the explanation 
that it was the easiest method for reducing the fi nancial burden of parishes (Fideler 
2006, p. 154). Between 1723 and 1750, approximately 600 new workhouses were 
established in England and Wales, many of which “were constructed by or leased to 
local manufactures eager to avail themselves of the supply of cheap labour” (Ashcraft 
 1996 , p. 48). 
 The schemes for employing the poor rested on the so-called  utility of the poor doc-
trine, whose main tenet was the acceptance of forced labor by the poor as a necessary 
condition for national prosperity (Furniss  1920 ). This mindset rested on a specifi c 
understanding of human nature and attitude toward the work of the poor. The common 
belief was that the poor did not work because they were naturally idle and inclined 
toward licentious behavior (Mun 1664; Dunning 1686; Cary 1695; Locke 1696; Defoe 
1704; Mandeville [1714] 1962; Clayton 1755). Dorothy Marshall summarized the 
mercantilist point of view whereby the aversion to labor of the poor was perceived as 
immoral because it represented the amount by which a nation’s wealth “could have 
been increased, and was not” (Marshall  1956 , p. 181). From this perspective, since a 
negative attitude toward work was an inborn trait of the poor, only “penury and want” 
could make them “wise and industrious” (Mun 1664, p. 73). If wages were fair, the 
poor would work considerably less (grasping the essence of what was later described 
as a backward-bending labor supply curve) and spend their money on alcohol, gam-
bling, etc. Also, wages above bare subsistence would destroy the poor’s productivity 
and encourage insolent and impertinent behavior (Furniss  1920 , p. 118). Thus, low 
wages were seen as a disciplining tool for transforming the poor into more respectful 
and subordinate subjects (Marshall  1998 , p. 310). 
 In 1681, an anonymous writer discussing the “strange idleness and stubbornness of 
our poor” claimed that “surly most of them will not work at all, unless they might earn 
as much in two days as will keep them a week. And when they do work they will often 
mar what they do” (Anon. 1681, p. 8, quoted in Sobel  1989 , p. 25). However, the 
canonical position on the issue was expressed by John Locke (1632–1704), who, 
in 1697, argued that poverty “can be nothing else but relaxation of discipline and 
corruption of manners” (Locke [1697] 1997, p. 184). Throughout the following cen-
tury, adherence to this view was reiterated on many occasions. Daniel Defoe argued 
that “there is a general Taint of Slothfulness upon the Poor, [so that] there’s nothing 
more frequent, than for an Englishman to Work till he got his Pocket full of Money, 
and then go and be idle, or perhaps drunk, till ‘tis all gone, and perhaps himself in 
Debt” (Defoe 1704, p. 27; see also Mandeville [1714] 1962, p. 192). In 1755, the cler-
gyman John Clayton (1709–1773) maintained, “It is a melancholy Truth which cannot 
be concealed … that much of the poor’s Mysery is owing to themselves; and may with 
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great Justice be imputed to that Idleness, Extravagance, and Mismanagement, which 
are as notorious, as the Poverty that proceeds from them” (Clayton 1755, p. 5). Three 
years later, the clothier and writer on economics William Temple (1705–1773) stated 
that laborers “are guided in their pursuit by hunger and lust … the only way to make 
[the poor] temperate and industrious is to lay them under the necessity of labouring all 
the time they can spare from meals and sleep in order to procure the common necessity 
of life” (Temple 1758, pp. 56–57). In 1786, the Anglican clergyman, physician, 
and geologist Joseph Townsend (1739–1816) recalled, “The Poor know little of the 
motives which stimulate the higher ranks to action—pride, honour and ambition. 
In general, it is only hunger which can spur and goad them on to labour” (Townsend 
1786, p. 23). In Townsend’s opinion, poverty was not only “a law of nature” but also 
the necessary motive for labor (Townsend 1786, p. 51).  3  
 As the schemes for employing the poor were more consistent with the needs of the 
emerging capitalist economy than with those of the poor, they generated an interplay 
of contradictory stimuli (Nacol  2012 , p. 4). Even if workhouses were ideally meant to 
provide the poor with a chance to reinforce their rights and duties as members of the 
community, a minority stream of thought contested, on both moral and economic 
grounds, the desirability and effi ciency of the workhouse system. Gender segregation, 
poor diet, and horrifying working and hygienic conditions led the Quaker economic 
thinker and social reformer John Bellers to claim that “[a] workhouse bespeaks too 
much of servitude” (Bellers 1696, p. 28). In 1722, the same view was endorsed by the 
politician and writer Lawrence Braddon, who recognized, “Many thousands of the 
incapable Poor are almost starved for want; thousands of them not having above nine-
pence per head per week, for Lodging, Diet and all Necessaries” (Braddon 1722, p. 62). 
In 1732, an unknown  Overseer reported that “we have many here who would choose 
to starve, rather than be maintained in … the house of correction, as they call it” (anon. 
1732, p. 127). During the second half of the eighteenth century, the perception that the 
utility of the poor doctrine led to the establishment of a system of relief that turned the 
poor into objects of scrutiny and control became even more crisp (Maisse 1757; 
Scott 1773, p. 36; Potter 1775, p. 52; Zouch 1776, pp. 6, 19–21, 34, 41–43; Jones 1776, 
pp. 11–15; Blackstone [1776] 1803, p. 439). 
 Yet, it was Daniel Defoe who provided the most infl uential challenge to the system 
of indoor relief. In order to prove its ineffi ciency, he supported his analysis with strict 
analytical arguments.  4  Offering work to the unemployed was wrong, he claimed, 
because it failed to consider three major factors. First, unemployment was not due to 
lack of labor demand.  5  Second, poverty should not be disciplined through institutions 
designed to provide work for the poor. Third, state intervention on behalf of the poor would 
end up increasing rather than decreasing poverty (Defoe 1704, p. 9). Defoe defended 
 
3
 Echoes of this way of conceiving poverty as a motive for labor can be found in Malthus (1798). According 
to James Bonar, Malthus “thought to have shown the power of poverty as the cause of labour” (Bonar  1885 , 
p. 41). Also, in the  Poor Law Commissioners Report of 1834, it was held that poverty was the best incentive 
to labor ( Poor Law Commissioners Report 1834, p. 227). 
 
4
 Before Defoe, John White (1630, p. 20), Samuel Hartlib (1649, p. 8), and John Graunt (1662, p. 351) had 
already expressed their concerns about the economic and administrative rationale governing the system of 
indoor relief (Slack  1999 ). 
 
5
 Like Locke, he blamed the increase of poverty on a deterioration of morals and an increase in idleness and 
extravagance (Defoe 1704, p. 543). 
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English manufactures because they represented the foundation of trade. They were “so 
Essential to the Publick Benefi t” that any forced alteration would cause “irreparable 
Damage to the publick” (ibid., p. 544). More workhouses would represent a “Grievance 
to the Nation” because their establishment would upset the interregional division of 
labor, distorting the natural order of trade. When the produce of workhouses did not 
fi nd new outlets, Defoe believed, the only alternative would have been to bring it into 
the current market to compete with the goods of private manufactures. 
 The consequences were obvious for Defoe. Existing private manufactures would be 
weakened due to competition with public workhouses. The trade industry would be 
negatively affected because, if each parish became self-suffi cient by producing its own 
goods, thanks to the labor of the poor, it would make “our Towns and Counties inde-
pendent of one another, and put a dump to Correspondence [or communication]” 
(ibid., p. 545). Defoe concluded that “this will ruin all the Carriers in England,” as “the 
wool will be all Manufactured where it is sheer’d, every body will make their own 
Cloaths, and the Trade which now lives by running thro’ a multitude of Hands will go 
then through so few, that thousands of families will want Employment” (ibid.). 
 Defoe’s attack against the Poor Laws should not induce us to think that he was 
indifferent to the fate of the poor. In an earlier pamphlet, he placed poverty and unem-
ployment among the worst social ills and suggested a remedy. The ultimate end of 
Defoe’s  An Essay Upon Projects was to “banish beggary and poverty out of the kingdom” 
(Defoe 1697, p. 171) by replacing the contemporary state of affairs with a society in 
which “all mankind, be they never so mean, so poor, so unable, shall gain for himself, 
a just claim to a comfortable subsistence” (ibid., p. 23). In his opinion, the best way to 
eradicate poverty was not by establishing more workhouses, but rather by introducing 
a nationwide Friendly Society, which the laboring poor  6  would be obliged to join to 
provide for themselves in times of sickness or unemployment, thus taking the 
strain off the authorities in charge of poor relief (ibid., p. 118). This had the advantage, 
he argued, that all “disasters in the world might be prevented by it, and mankind 
be secured from all miseries, indigences, and distresses that happened in the world” 
(ibid., p. 123). 
 The logic upon which Defoe built his case was impeccable: “‘tis kind that my 
Neighbor shou’d Relieve me if I fall into Distress or Decay; so ‘tis but Equal he shou’d 
do so if I agreed to have done the same for him; and if God Almighty has Commanded 
us to Relieve and Help one another in Distress, sure it must be commendable to bind 
our selves by Agreement to Obey that Command” (ibid., p. 87). Defoe’s reciprocity 
rule led him to elaborate an insurance scheme open to all laboring people under the age 
of fi fty (men and women alike with the exception of soldiers and beggars), each paying 
an initial fee of sixpence and one shilling per quarter (ibid., pp. 146–147). In return, 
they would become eligible for a selected range of benefi ts, such as free medical care 
in case of accidents and sickness, a lifetime pension of twelve pence per week for loss 
of limbs, residence in a hospital for the elderly and infi rm, widows’ maintenance, etc. 
Claims could not be made in the fi rst year of the program for any reason. 
 
6
 The  Essay disclosed a disturbing problem that characterized post-revolutionary England: the existence of 
the laboring poor. In this pamphlet, Defoe showed that the problem could not be treated simply according 
to the rules of a competitive market or via state intervention alone. Rather, the solution required the 
involvement of the poor themselves. 
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 Defoe’s assumption that common risks give people common interests could have 
had substantial implications for social policy. Since all members of society faced the 
risk of either becoming poor or paying for maintaining the poor, the shared risk would 
have brought the entire population within the purview of Friendly Societies. He 
believed that if the scheme were implemented, the laboring poor, in times of economic 
distress, could avoid poverty not by relying on public or private charity, but thanks to 
their membership in a Friendly Society.  7  As we shall see below, although nothing 
came of Defoe’s proposal, throughout the eighteenth century, Friendly Societies played 
an important role in the life of the working poor. Especially during the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century, authors such as Richard Price (1771), Francis Maseres (1772), 
Thomas Gilbert (1786), Joseph Townsend (1786), John Acland (1786), and Sir Frederick 
Morton Eden (1797) would discuss “ways in which mutual benefi t societies might be 
encouraged in order to induce the working classes to practice self-help” (Solt Dennis 
 2005 , p. 4). 
 III.  THE NEW VIEW ON HIGHER WAGES, INEQUALITY, AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 In a context where the newly established patterns of consumption constantly reduced 
the previous limits to national prosperity, those who championed the emancipation of 
the low ranks of society had to confront a resilient opposition. The belief that the poor 
had their rightful place at the bottom of the social ladder persisted throughout the 
eighteenth century (Fielding 1751, p. 5; Alcock 1752, p. 9; Townsend 1786, p. 35). 
Advocates believed that an increased standard of living for the poor represented a 
menace for society. The poor, they insisted, “might cease to labor, and so destroy the 
trade upon which English prosperity was built” (Marshall [1926] 2007, p. 34). 
 Although, at the end of the seventeenth century, the shortcomings of the utility of 
the poor doctrine had been pointed out (Harris 1691, p. 53; Gouldsmith 1725, p. 18), 
it was only from the second quarter of the eighteenth century that a new and dynamic 
idea of economic development emerged, recognizing that “causation runs from the 
poor relief and the minimization of risk and uncertainty that it entailed to economic 
success” and not the other way around (Smith  1986 , p. 206). 
 The fi rst author who addressed this issue was Jacob Vanderlint. He defi ned the 
necessary consumption level of laborers by assuming a direct relationship between the 
rise in real wages and an increase in the laborer’s industriousness. Apropos, he intro-
duced the idea of an appropriate level: a wage suitable to “support such a family as 
is often the lot of them to have” (Vanderlint 1734, p. 15). Conversely, he believed, 
“[l]owering wages would be injurious since the labouring class, being the bulk of 
mankind, would in this case affect consumption of things in general so mightily that 
there would be a want of trade and business among the other part of the people” (ibid., 
p. 120). In fact, he believed that better rewards would have led to further efforts on the 
part of the workers: “The working people can and will do a great deal more work than 
 
7
 Defoe’s advocacy for self-help did not prevent him from acknowledging the importance of public relief—
provided that it was confi ned specifi cally to the impotent poor (Defoe 1713, pp. 3–4). 
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they do, if they were suffi ciently encouraged. For I take it for a maxim, that the people of 
no class will ever want industry, if they don’t want encouragement.” He added, “We 
know the weavers, dyers, taylors, etc. at such time work almost night and day, only for 
the encouragements of somewhat better pay and wages, which an extraordinary demand 
for goods is necessarily connected with” (ibid., p. 122). In support of his case against the 
utility of the poor doctrine, he used both supply-side and demand-side arguments. 
 Between 1735 and 1737, the Bishop of Cloyne George Berkeley published the 
 Querist , a seminal pamphlet in which he strongly refuted the argument whereby only 
necessity induced the poor to work. He believed the best way to induce steady labor, 
cleanliness, and civil behavior was to expand the pattern of wants. As Berkeley put it: 
“Whether the creating of wants be not the likeliest way to produce industry in people? 
And, whether, if our peasants were accustomed to eat Beef, and wear Shoes, they 
would not be more industrious?” (Berkeley 1735–37, p. 5). He insisted that only by 
developing the domestic market could the poor advance their condition by using the 
assets at their disposal. This understanding is captured nicely in  Query 577 : “Whether 
it be not the Interest of England, that we should cultivate a domestic Commerce among 
ourselves? And whether it could give them any possible Jealousy, if our small Sum of Cash 
was contrived to go a little further, if there was a little more Life in our Markets, a little 
more buying and selling in our Shops, a little better Provision for the Backs and Bellies of 
many forlorn Wretches throughout the Towns and Villages of this Island?” (ibid., p. 121). 
Berkeley concluded that a nation’s wealth consisted of a well-fed, -clothed, and -housed 
population, and that, since such a wealth could stem only from human industry, the state 
had the duty to encourage the industriousness of its people (Kelly  1986 , p. 104). 
 By mid-century, a different economic landscape appeared. England was experiencing 
“a great expansion and an apparent growth of national income” (Marshall [1926] 2007, 
p. 79), but simultaneously, vast sectors of the population suffered severe unemploy-
ment and underemployment due to high food prices, low wages, and the effects of 
enclosures. As a result, by the end of the century, the laboring poor represented the 
majority of both internal migrants and poor relief recipients (King  1997 , pp. 325–326; 
Fideler 2006, p. 147). It was in this context that David Hume and Adam Smith carved 
out their infl uential ideas in the fi elds of social philosophy and economics, paving the 
way for a new vision of poverty and its remedies. 
 David Hume pointed out that  all members of the political community should enjoy 
the benefi ts of the newly established commercial society. Hume believed that “where 
the riches are in few hands, these must enjoy all the power, and will readily conspire 
to lay the whole burthen on the poor, and oppress them still farther, to the discour-
agement of all industry,” concluding that a “too great disproportion among the citizens 
weakens any state” (Hume [1752] 1955, p. 15). Hume offered another powerful state-
ment, anticipating a modern concept of welfare economics: “Every person, if possible, 
ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in a full possession of all necessaries and many 
of the conveniences of life. No one can doubt, but such equality is most suitable to 
human nature, and diminishes much less from the happiness of the rich than it adds to 
the poor” (ibid.). 
 Hume added seminal economic arguments to his ethical and political ones. 
He rejected the idea that high wages for the laboring poor would be benefi cial for 
enhancing national prosperity. An expanding economy requires new laborers, which in 
turn oblige fi rms to pay higher wages, which in their turn stimulate further economic 
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expansion (ibid., p. 37). As Claudia Schmidt cogently pointed out, here Hume seems 
to suggest that the promotion of a fl ourishing national economy requires not only “a 
basic level of subsistence, but also the possibility of an increasing level of prosperity 
for the working class” (Schmidt  2003 , p. 304). Hume, who was writing at the end of a 
period of low infl ation, believed that real wages would increase together with the 
quantity and the quality of the manufactured goods. As he put it, the worker
 carries his money to the market, where he fi nds everything at the same price as 
formerly, but returns with greater quantity and of better kinds, for the use of his family. 
The farmer and the gardener, fi nding, that all their commodities are taken off, apply 
themselves with alacrity to the rising more; and at the same time can afford to take 
better and more clothes from their tradesmen, whose price is the same as formerly, 
and their industry only whetted by so much new gain. (Hume [1752] 1955, p. 38) 
Thus, national production was fostered by a policy of high wages that would expand 
the market for traded goods without provoking infl ation. 
 Shifting to a microeconomic perspective, Hume dismissed the idea that indolence, 
laziness, and idleness were inborn traits that only harsh working and living conditions 
could overcome. According to Hume, laborers were not hostile to work per se:
 Indolence or repose, indeed, seems not, of itself, to contribute much to our enjoyment; 
but like sleep, is requisite as an indulgence to the weakness of human nature, which 
cannot support an uninterrupted course of business or pleasure. That quick march of 
the spirits, which takes a man from himself, and chiefl y gives satisfaction, does in the 
end exhaust the mind, and requires some intervals of repose, which, tho’ agreeable for 
a moment, yet, if prolong’d, beget a languor and lethargy, that destroy all enjoyment. 
(ibid., p. 25) 
On these grounds, he rejected the dominant view that the resistance to work could be 
overcome only by constant repetition. The only achievement of such a course of 
action, according to him, would be the development of a ‘passive habit’ of work. 
Instead, to acquire an active habit of work, workers should be offered some form 
of variety and challenge (Hume 1739–40, p. 263). 
 Though Hume acknowledged that  necessity “is the great spur to industry and inven-
tion” (Hume [1752] 1955, pp. 17–18), his reasoning provided support to the idea that 
higher wages were the best incentive for English workers’ diligence and industry 
(Hume [1752] 1955, p. 13; see also Coats  1958 , p. 67; Marshall  1998 , p. 313).  8  Hume 
developed a twofold argument that had signifi cant policy implications. First, he explic-
itly linked the consumption of luxury goods to a vibrant economy. Imported luxury 
goods provide novel and exotic “delicacies and luxuries” that “gratify the senses and 
appetites.” They can “rouse men from their indolence” by exposing them to things 
“never before dreamed of” (Hume [1752] 1955, pp. 13–14).  9  By contrast, he affi rmed 
 
8
 Hume never advocated an increase in real wages as a means for increasing worker productivity. 
 
9
 The economic ideas championed by English economic thinkers were echoed especially in France where 
the system of Poor Laws did not exist. In particular, the questions of consumption and the role of demand 
were clearly analyzed by Pierre le Pesant de Boisguilbert (1704, pp. 29–30), François Veron de Forbonnais 
(1754), Vincent de Gournay (1754), and, a little later, by the Physiocrats. In France, these refl ections were 
independent of any progress in social legislation. 
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that in the absence of demand for superfl uities, “men sink into indolence, lose all 
enjoyment of life” (ibid., p. 15). Second, he noted that fair wages were the most pow-
erful incentive for working hard. He further added, “It is a violent method and in most 
cases impracticable to oblige the labourer to toil, in order to raise from the land more 
than what subsists himself and the family. Furnish him with manufactures and com-
modities, and he will do it of himself” (ibid., p. 12). It was on this ground, Edward 
Soule argued, that Hume supported state intervention “in labor relations for … 
ensuring that workers be paid fairly and that they not be denied the fruits of their labor” 
(Soule  2000 , p. 144). 
 Between the end of the 1750s and the beginning of the 1770s, pro-poor labor senti-
ments became stronger. Malachy Postlethwayt argued that the poor were not respon-
sible for being idle, and neither were they criminal, because “if they were suffi ciently 
encouraged” they “would work far more than they do” (Postlethwayt 1759, p. 43). 
A few years later, Nathaniel Forster (1726?–1790) and Thomas Mortimer (1730–1810) 
argued against low wages. In 1767, the former maintained, “If a man sees that the 
harder he labours, the higher he shall be taxed, or if he fi nds in private life that his 
wages are lowered in proportion to his industry, is it in nature that either of these 
circumstances should tend to increase his industry? They must always have a contrary 
effect, and will necessarily crush and extinguish it” (Forster 1767, p. 58). He con-
cluded that it was “as good a general maxim as ever was advanced, that the sure way 
of engaging a man to go through a work with vigour and spirit is, to ensure him a taste 
of the sweets of it” (ibid., p. 61). In 1772, the latter argued that it was “the combined 
plagues of dearness of provisions, incessant labour and low wages” (Mortimer 1772, 
p. 90) that diminished both the skills and creativity of laborers. Also, the critic of the 
laziness of the lower ranks of society, Josiah Tucker, argued that any productive fea-
ture of economic progress requires increasing living standards for the working classes. 
Tucker believed that an appropriate reward for labor was desirable because it would 
prompt a speedier division of labor, and the productivity obtained would in turn be 
used to pay higher wages: “In such a Case, Is it not much cheaper to give 2s. 6d. a Day 
in the rich Country to the nimble and adroit Artist, than it is to give only 6d. in the poor 
one, to the tedious, awkward Bungler?” (Tucker 1774, p. 34). 
 Adam Smith was probably the most infl uential pundit who questioned the prevail-
ing views on the effects of poverty. He was truly concerned both with the plight of 
severe poverty (Himmelfarb  1984 , pp. 46–62) and the imbalances of economic power 
among the social classes (Baum  1992 , p. 144). Smith’s approach to poverty was 
extremely innovative and radical: by escaping “from the marshy ground of morality, 
religion, or politics,” he “took the bold step of linking poverty with the dynamic 
working of the economic system of production” (Ashcraft  1996 , p. 54). Though the 
 Wealth of Nations’ primary focus was economic growth, “universal opulence” should 
“extend itself to the lowest ranks of people” (Smith [1776] 1976, p. 15). Bettering the 
living conditions of the poor was advantageous to all:
 Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of 
every great political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part 
can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be 
fl ourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and mis-
erable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body 
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of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be 
themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged. (ibid., p. 88) 
 Smith’s persuasion that economic freedom led to economic growth was coupled with 
his concern for economic inequality. Similarly to Hume, he claimed that the varying 
statuses of the different strata of society did not derive from the faults of individuals, but 
rather from circumstances (ibid., p. 19), and emphasized the inequality intrinsic to the 
process of economic growth: “Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. 
For one very rich man, there must be at least fi ve hundred poor, and the affl uence of the 
few suppose the indigence of the many” (ibid., p. 232). Possibly more important, Smith 
found Locke’s idea that poverty was a product of lack of discipline and/or corruption of 
manners unconvincing. Laziness and intemperance are not inherent traits of the poor, but 
rather the result of adverse institutional or economic circumstances. For instance, those 
who were unemployed due to sickness or disability bore no responsibility for their 
condition, which was neither deserved nor a fate that they could escape from with the 
resources at their disposal. Thus, Smith saw no faults in the morals of the laboring poor. 
The poor were prudent, industrious, and refl ective citizens (Rothschild  1995 , p. 4), and 
they were so concerned with their social position that “a creditable day-labourer would 
be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt” (Smith [1776] 1976, p. 399). 
 Furthermore, Smith held that the main drive governing human action was not 
necessity, but rather the desire to better one’s condition  10  that “comes with us from the 
womb, and never leaves us till we go to the grave” (ibid., pp. 362–363). He thought 
this applied to all social classes. A poor laborer, like any other citizen, was moti-
vated by the prospect of “ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty” (ibid., p. 91); he 
also championed fair wages for the working class. Smith’s affi rmations rested on the 
consideration that they were an indicator of a fl ourishing and healthy economy as well 
as an essential feature of a fair society. 
 He opposed the prevailing wisdom that in “cheap years, … workmen are generally 
more idle, and in dear ones more industrious then ordinary” (ibid., p. 85). In Smith’s 
eyes, this was a falsehood circulated by the “Master of all sorts” who “frequently make 
better bargains with their servants in dear than in cheap years, and they fi nd them more 
humble and dependent in the former than in the latter. They naturally, therefore, com-
mend the former as more favourable to industry” (ibid.). He also opposed the idea that 
high wages would lead to a decrease in labor supply. He acknowledged that “some 
workmen, indeed, when they can earn in four days what will maintain them through 
the week, will be idle the other three. This, however, is by no means the case with the 
greater part” (ibid., p. 91). On the contrary, he maintained, “[w]hen wages are high … 
we shall always fi nd the working man more active, diligent and expeditious, than when 
they are low” (ibid., p. 85). It is improbable, he added, “that men in general should 
work better when they are ill fed than when they are well fed, when they are disheart-
ened than when they are in good spirits, when they are frequently sick than when they 
are generally in good health” (ibid., p. 92); “The wages of labour are the encourage-
ment of industry, which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the 
encouragement it receives” (ibid., p. 91). 
 
10
 He rejected the argument according to which people work harder when they are afraid, or when real 
wages are low (Smith [1776] 1976, p. 92). 
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 One cannot but agree with Blaug’s statement that Smith’s overall opinion on the 
Poor Laws has been either ignored or, worse, misinterpreted (Blaug  1978 , p. 157). It is 
well known that Smith was uncomfortable with the Act of Settlement and Removal 
(Smith [1776] 1976, p. 157). However, his opposition to the 1662 Act was limited to 
the hindering of the free circulation of labor throughout the country, which interfered 
with his system of  natural liberty : “To remove a man who has committed no misde-
meanor from the parish where he chooses to reside, is an evident violation of natural 
liberty and justice” (ibid.). Nothing in this argument can be taken as a general attack 
on the Poor Laws as such. Geoffrey Gilbert’s inference seems to be accurate that Smith 
had no objections to the principle of the Poor Laws, or he would have expressed them 
(Gilbert  1997 , p. 287).  11  Incidentally, the argument against the Settlement Act was 
related to the problem of the increasing costs of poor relief. If the poor had been free 
to move from place to place in search of gainful occupation, not only would their 
liberty have increased considerably, but that mobility also would have contributed to 
reducing the tax burden. 
 Although Smith was very cautious in expressing a view with regard to government 
intervention in assisting the poor,  12  he did believe that “some attention of government 
is necessary in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the 
great body of the people” (Smith [1776] 1976, p. 734). Smith’s reasoning rested on the 
idea that there were shortcomings in economic progress. If, on the one side, the division 
of labor improved the workers’ dexterity, on the other side, it corrupted his “intellectual, 
social, and marital virtues” (ibid., p. 327). It was for this reason that Smith’s idea of 
social welfare called for a government concerned with the health of both the mind and 
the body of its people: “Even though the material spirit of the people were of no use 
towards the defense of society, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, 
and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading them-
selves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention 
of government” (ibid., p. 739).  13  Both social reformers and political leaders during the 
1780s and 1790s would take the above guidelines very seriously. The  Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations “became a textbook for statesmen seeking 
to avoid the twin specters of famine and destitution” (Cowherd  1977 , p. xiii). 
 IV.  THE  POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCLUSION AND THE SHAPING 
OF THE NEW POOR LAWS 
 Economic theory can become a theory of societal change only within a historical con-
text. In this and in the following section, we evaluate whether the line of defense 
 
11
 Geoffrey’s argument resembles very closely the one proposed by Jacob Viner, who believed that if Smith 
had been pressed, he would have expressed approval for poor relief (Viner [ 1927 ] 1958, p. 241). Other 
scholars have differing views on the subject. To the same question, Blaug answers with a sound “no” 
(Blaug  1978 , p. 50), while Samuel Hollander does not provide a clear-cut answer (Hollander  1973 , p. 243). 
 
12
 For him, it was a matter of “the greatest delicacy” (Smith [1759] 1976, p. 734). 
 
13
 Smith also proposed better regulation of the wheat market so as to reduce the price of bread without 
penalizing the producers. This can be confi gured as an anti-poverty policy as it could be understood as an 
indirect subsidy to the poor (Smith [1776] 1976, I, p. 587). 
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devised by social reformers against high infl ation and reduced levels of income, which 
characterized the last quarter of the eighteenth century, was consistent with the refl ec-
tions that emerged from the fi eld of political economy. Though further research must 
be undertaken, an initial comparison can be made of how economists’ arguments and 
social legislation suggest unintended convergences—the combination of which may 
have contributed to shaping a social security system whereby the mass of the laboring 
poor enjoyed rights, dignity, and assistance (Mitchison  1991 , p. 33). 
 This very point marks the pre-Malthusian stage of the discussion. As Donald Winch 
pointed out, T. Robert Malthus’s message was that poverty should be alleviated through 
voluntary charity and not by “the forced varieties that have spread through use of the 
allowance system” (Winch  1998 , p. 15). From this perspective, the round of reforms 
that occurred in the last quarter of the eighteenth century confused moral duty with 
the task of legislating. One of Malthus’s closest followers stated that compulsion 
had destroyed “the very essence not only of benevolence, but of all virtue,” since the 
decision to be virtuous must be voluntary (Coplestone  1819 , p. 18). This mindset also 
attracted one of Smith’s closest disciples, the Calvinist Reverend Thomas Chalmers 
(1780–1847), who argued for the abolishment of the Poor Laws. Like Malthus, he saw 
charity as an active Christian principle not to be confounded with “the passive obliga-
tion like the rates paid to maintain a poor law” (Goodlad  2003 , p. 18). As Chalmers put 
it, charity was a gift of “judgement,” “time and attention,” and monetary assistance 
(Chalmers  1900 , p. 221; see also Alcock 1752, p. 21). 
 Gilbert’s attempts to raise the poor’s standard of living while reducing the tax 
burden began in 1765 when his proposal to incorporate parishes into large districts 
was defeated in the House of Lords by sixty-six votes to fi fty-nine.  14  Gilbert did not 
surrender, and prepared for other attempts at reform. In the following years, he accu-
mulated impressive data on poverty. He developed a framework to address the preoc-
cupations already expressed by economic thinkers like Defoe and other observers 
before him. In 1781, he wrote that workhouses were “generally inhabited by all Sorts 
of Persons. … Hence arise Confusion, Disorder, and Distresses, not easily to be 
described. I have long thought it a great Defect in the Management of the common 
Workhouses, that all Descriptions of poor Persons should be sent thither; where, for 
the most Part, they are very ill accommodated” (Gilbert 1781, pp. 6–8). As stern vigi-
lance and refusal for outdoor relief were a course of action very diffi cult to maintain, 
considering the altered economic conditions, Gilbert proposed that, for the sake of 
both the poor and the rates, workhouses should be reformed to promote industrious 
behavior (ibid., p. 11). 
 By the 1780s, Gilbert’s objectives had become many: fi rst, he meant to repeal the 
practice of farming out the poor; second, he wanted to extend mobility to the laboring 
poor; third, he meant to provide outdoor relief to the most possible number of needy 
 
14
 It is interesting to note that the same year, the French clergyman and economist Nicolas Baudeau (1730–
1792) published  Idées d’un citoyen sur les besoins, les droits et les devoirs des vrais pauvres (1765). In this 
work, Baudeau extended Montesquieu’s idea of a national obligation to provide public assistance to the 
poor. Baudeau’s fundamental principle was “that the supreme bureau would have ownership and control of 
all properties, funds, and income intended for the aid of the poor throughout the kingdom, and that it would 
be responsible for maintaining this fund and improving it” (McStay Adam 1990, p. 47). As with Gilbert’s 
proposal, it did not lead to substantial reforms. 
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persons; fi nally, he aimed to reduce the Poor Rates. Success smiled at him when, in 
1783, Parliament fi nally passed three Bills that substantially amended the Workhouse 
Test Act. Gilbert’s Bills made provisions for the unemployed, the rogues, vagabonds, 
sturdy beggars, and the impotent poor. To meet the needs of the fi rst category, he pro-
posed to make it easier for the unemployed to move from rural parishes to industrial 
towns while creating more job opportunities through public works. Parishes had “to 
provide for the Maintenance and Employment of their Poor at a common Expence, 
without farming them out” (Gilbert 1781, p. 6). For the second group, he proposed to 
lodge them in houses of correction, rather than in workhouses, since they were less 
severe in handling the poor (Cowherd  1960 , p. 331). Workhouses were transformed 
into residences and remained available for children, the old, and the infi rm. 
 Gilbert believed that in most cases, it was preferable for the impotent poor “to 
remain in their own Habitations (if they have any) or to be placed with any Friend or 
Relation, at weekly Allowances, adapted to their Circumstances and Situation; it being 
understood, in all these Cases, that the Persons who keep them shall have the benefi t 
of such Labour as they are able to perform; and weekly Pay to be fi xed accordingly” 
(Gilbert 1781, p. 8). The rationale for this resolution rested on the twofold idea that 
workhouses had high running costs compared to their productive capacities and that 
inmates were deprived of their freedom. Like Smith, Gilbert was unconvinced by the 
Law of Settlement and Removal. Accordingly, his reform contributed to relaxing the 
geographical immobility of the laboring poor by prohibiting the removal of both sick 
members and pregnant mothers belonging to the parishes reunited under its provision 
(Gilbert 1781, pp. 4–7).  15  Gilbert supported his preference for allowances rather than 
indoor relief by pointing to the inadequacy of wages at a time when the changing economic 
situation pushed entrepreneurs to “rely on the free competitive market to determine the 
price of labour” (Mencher  1967 , p. 110). He was successful in his cause because, in 
the eyes of the economic elite, providing an adequate income for the able-bodied 
unemployed was preferable to establishing adequate wage standards (ibid.).  16  
 By the end of the century, England was at war with France and foodstuffs were 
diffi cult to import from abroad. Life became extremely harsh, and the price of bread 
soared. The already precarious conditions of the poor were further worsened by a 
series of scarce harvests, which gave rise to food shortages and riots. Repeatedly 
reported by eminent observers, the severity of the situation called for more drastic 
measures than those incorporated by the Gilbert Act.  17  An attempt to reduce the poor’s 
 
15
 Gilbert’s work paved the way to the approval by Parliament of the Removal Act (1795) that prohibited 
“the ejectment of poor immigrants unless they actually become chargeable to the parish” (Mokyr  1999 , p. 35). 
 
16
 The Poor Law Returns of 1803 assessed Gilbert’s success. By that time, the majority of the workhouses 
had turned into poorhouses and, out of nearly a million poor, only 83,000 received indoor relief. 
Furthermore, the expenditure for the materials needed to put the poor to work amounted to less than 
£50,000. The practice of contracting out of the poor was enforced only in 293 parishes ( Abstract of Returns 
1804, p. 716). 
 
17
 As Eden (1766–1809) claimed, the situation was so bad for the poor that “numberless extraordinary 
demands for parochial assistance” were made both by the “infi rm and impotent” and by the “able-bodied and 
industrious who had, very few of them, ever applied to the parish for relief.” This situation led him to recog-
nize that laborers were due an increase in wages: “There was no doubt but that the circumstances of the times 
required an increase in the income of the labourers in husbandry, who, in this country at least, compose the 
most numerous body of those liable to want assistance form the parish” (Eden 1797, pp. 120–121). 
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hardship was made by extending to all the laboring poor the provisions made in 1793 
by the Rose Act, whereby no industrious laborers looking for employment outside 
their parish could be removed until they became dependent upon the parish for relief 
(35  Geo . III, c. 101). However, given the exceptional situation, this law, designed to 
increase the mobility of labor, had to be “enacted in conjunction with the increase 
in outdoor casual relief” (Cowherd  1960 , p. 334). Starting from the premise that 
the Workhouse Test Act was “inconvenient and oppressive inasmuch as it often pre-
vents an industrious person from receiving such occasional relief as is best suited to 
the peculiar case of such poor person” (36  Geo . III. C. 23, in Eden 1797, p. 238), 
the Relief of the Poor Act (1795) commanded the justices of the peace to grant 
casual relief “to any industrious poor person” who fi nds himself in “temporary 
distress,” adding that “he shall be entitled to ask and receive such a relief at his home 
or house” (ibid.). 
 In April 1795, following a poor harvest, the governing elite of Berkshire County,  18  
fearing popular upheaval, decided to hold a meeting at the Pelican Inn in Speenhamland 
to discuss the “miserable state of the labourers and the necessity of increasing their 
wages to subsistence level, instead of leaving them to resort to the parish offi cer for 
support for their families” (Hammond and Hammond [1911] 1929, p. 137). Chaired 
by Charles Dundas (1751–1832) and attended by local magistrates and clergymen, 
the meeting was held on May 6.  19  On that occasion, the elites of Berkshire County 
discharged the minimum wage option and passed a resolution based on the premise 
that “the present state of the poor does require further assistance than has been gener-
ally given them” (Berkshire Session Order of Book 1791–1795, in Aspinall 1959, p. 414). 
In order to retain the affection of and control over their laborers, the justice of the 
peace established “that every man has the right to a minimum subsistence, and that 
if he can earn only part of it then society owes him the difference” (Mantoux  1905 , 
p. 437). With the blessing of both farmers and landlords, it was thus decided that “sub-
sidies in aid of wages should be granted in accordance with a scale dependent on the 
price of bread, so that a minimum income should be assured to the poor irrespective of 
their earnings” (Polanyi [ 1944 ] 1998, p. 78).  20  The 1824 Returns showed that a system 
 
18
 Situated on the periphery of the declining southwest textile industry, Berkshire County was heavily 
affected by enclosures. As Mantoux observed: “In the south-west the general distress caused by the rise in 
the cost of living had been aggravated by a crisis in the woolen industry, which at the time was thought to 
be only temporary, but was, in fact, the beginning of an irretrievable decay, fi nally to deprive the country 
people of one of their traditional resources” (Mantoux 1955, p. 436). 
 
19
 The architect of the Speenhamland system was Sir Christopher Willoughby, an adviser on penal policy 
and a member of the Board of Agriculture, who had been involved in surveying wages and prices in 1794. 
As Eastwood pointed out, he “had a statistical basis and an analytical context against which to understand 
the likely impact of massive food prices rises in late 1794 and early 1795” (Eastwood  2002 , p. 52). 
 
20
 During the Speenhamland era, there were other mechanisms devised to make sure that the incomes of the 
poor were insulated from rising prices due to the Napoleonic infl ation and poor harvests. In addition to 
allowances in relief of wages (for those employed and funded by the parish), the ways by which the unem-
ployed were aided outside the workhouse were the labor rates, the roundsman, and, to a lesser extent, 
public works. The combination of these measures was compatible with the understanding of economic 
development proposed by late mercantilist and Classical economic thinkers like Hume and Smith. 
Providing fi nancial help to the poor in case of hardship presupposed the realization that they were not 
inherently idle, but rather victims of circumstance. Furthermore, it provided a more balanced relationship 
between personal freedom and economic growth, as well as a more equitable distribution of income. 
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of supplementary wages from the parish funds had become usual practice in many 
counties. 
 Even if this rule was never formally transposed into law, it radically altered the 
workings of the Poor Laws for the forty years that followed.  21  This form of non-
residential guaranteed minimum income, independent of workers’ earnings, not only 
guaranteed minimal subsistence in times of hardship and additional purchasing power 
when circumstances improved, but also allowed for greater mobility for laborers in 
seeking employment. It helped the laboring population cope with the inability of the 
labor market to offer suffi cient wages (income) and occupations (Smelser  1959 , p. 357). 
It aided the ‘victims’ of technological change by preventing both the laboring poor and 
the unemployed from becoming dependent on parish relief, providing a wage subsidy on 
which to subsist (Snell  1985 , pp. 104–105). Above all, this system allowed a consider-
able amount of resources to be transferred from the landowners, upon which most of the 
tax burden under the Poor Laws fell, to the manufacturing entrepreneurs, who benefi ted 
from the relatively lower wages permitted by the payment of allowances to their workers. 
 Authors like Mark Blaug and Daniel Baugh highlight that under the Speenhamland 
system, the laboring poor were better equipped to exploit the economic opportunities 
available to them. Three of Blaug’s arguments are important for our analysis. First, he 
argued that low wages were not an effect of outdoor relief, but rather the reason for 
enforcing allowances in aid of wages (Blaug  1963 , pp. 161–162; and 1964, p. 242). 
Second, in sharp contrast with Donald McCloskey (McCloskey  1973 , pp. 424–427), 
he pointed out that the provision of allowances in aid of wages led to an increase in 
labor productivity by restoring “nutritional defi ciencies” caused by substandard wage 
rates (Blaug  1963 , p. 155).  22  Last, he showed that the funds provided for outdoor relief 
were so low that it could not have been “an attractive alternative to gainful employ-
ment” (Blaug  1963 , pp. 161–162). Baugh supported another of Blaug’s fi ndings, that 
the workers’ average income did not decline between 1792 and 1814, “for, if [it] 
had, the real cost of relief should have risen” (Baugh  1975 , p. 61). He also agreed with 
Blaug that, even in the short run, the allowance system “did not produce a disincentive 
to labour,” but provided an alternative explanation: “rural parishes were generally 
small enough to supply any relief with discretion” (ibid.). 
 Alternative solutions were considered, but soon discarded either for their impracti-
cability or for ideological reasons. Some suggested the introduction of a diet reform 
(Eden 1797, pp. 496–535; Colquhoun  1806 , pp. 273–274); others, like Rev. David 
Davies (1741–1819), the agriculturalist Arthur Young (1741–1820),  23  and Eden 
 
21
 In 1797, Pitt attempted—and failed—to press Parliament into passing the Speenhamland system into 
legislation. 
 
22
 Regarding low-wage agricultural workers, Blaug argued that a supplement to wages increased the con-
sumption and hence the energy and productivity of the workforce (Blaug  1964 , p. 242). Contrary to Blaug, 
Karl Polanyi considered the long-run results of the Speenhamland experiment “rather ghastly,” underlining, 
as one effect, that “[w]ithin a few years the productivity of labor began to sink to that of pauper labor … 
the intensity of labor, the care and effi ciency with which it was performed, … became indistinguishable 
from ‘boondoggling’” (Polanyi [ 1944 ] 1998, pp. 79–80). 
 
23
 Young was attuned to Smith’s ideas—especially his insistence on the poor’s self-determination, their 
responsibilization, and inducements for improving living standards through labor. It is worth mentioning 
that, like the economic thinker and Vicar of Dunmow John Howlett, Young was an advocate of enclosures 
as a way of increasing industriousness (Young 1794, p. 412). 
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proposed allotment schemes (Davies 1795, pp. 81–82; Eden 1797, I, pp. xx, and II, 
pp. 471, 687; Young  1801 , p. 509). The diet solution was discarded because its 
enforcement would have been too impractical, and allotments were rejected, as land 
redistribution was unwelcomed by both “the large farmer, who did not like saucy 
labourers, and the shopkeeper, who knew that the more food the labourer raised on 
his little estate the less would he buy at the village store” (Hammond and Hammond 
[1911] 1929, p. 159). Moreover, Davies and John Howlett (1731–1804), the latter at 
that time concerned with the effect of rising food prices on the lower class (Cowherd 
 1977 , p. 16; Neeson  1996 , p. 49), called for the establishment of a minimum wage 
to ensure that the laboring poor’s resources would not be overtaken by their expenses. 
After witnessing the misery that farmers had to endure over the last decade of the 
eighteenth century, Howlett began advocating for decent wages for agricultural 
laborers and underlined the positive effects of the Poor Laws (Howlett 1796, 
pp. 11–12).  24  
 While assessing how best to compensate rural laborers for the decreased standards 
of living caused by nearly fi fty years of Parliamentary enclosures,  25  the authorities 
considered Whitbread’s minimum wage Bill. Quoting one of the most recognized 
authorities in the fi eld of actuarial mathematics, Richard Price (1723–1791), Whitbread 
maintained that “in the course of two centuries, the price of labour had not increased 
more than three or at most four-fold; whereas the price of meat had increased in the 
proportion of six or seven; and that of clothing, no less than fourteen or fi fteen fold 
in the same time” (Cobbett  1818 , p. 703). The introduction of a minimum wage, 
Whitbread said, would “rescue the labouring poor from a state of slavish dependence; 
to enable the husbandman, who dedicated his days to incessant toil, to feed, to clothe, 
and to lodge his family with some degree of comfort” (ibid.). Opposed by an admirer 
of Smith’s (Himmelfarb  1984 , pp. 71–72), William Pitt (and his Tory government), 
Whitbread’s Bill was defeated. 
 A year later, Pitt submitted his own reform proposal. Reluctant to interfere with the 
regulation of wages,  26  he preferred to increase the mobility of the laboring poor 
because he believed that in doing so, “the wealth of the nation would be increased, the 
poor man rendered not only more comfortable but more virtuous, and the weight of 
the poor rates … greatly diminished” (Cobbett  1818 , p. 709).  27  He further called for the 
provision of casual outdoor relief to large families and single mothers, along with the 
establishment of schools of industry in order to offer some kind of education to poor 
children in the hopes that they would, one day, improve their position in life. The 
granting of credit to the poor for the “purchase of a cow or other capital which would 
 
24
 As Gilbert had done, Howlett pointed out the ineffi ciency of the workhouse system (Howlett 1781, 
pp. 39–40). 
 
25
 If, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, roughly half of the country’s arable soil was cultivated with 
the open fi eld system, by the end of the following century, 95% of that soil was enclosed (Thompson  1963 , 
p. 237; Deane  1965 , pp. 52–57; Hobsbawm and Rudé  1970 ). 
 
26
 Pitt feared “that if once wages were raised to meet the rise in prices it would not be easy to reduce them 
when the famine was over” (Hammond and Hammond [1911] 1929, p. 144). 
 
27
 Like Smith, Pitt believed that the “poor laws of this country, … had contributed to fetter the circulation 
of labor.... They had prevented the workman from going to that market where he could dispose of his 
industry to the greatest advantage” (Eden 1797, III, p. cccx). In economic terms, Pitt was also infl uenced 
by Tucker (Hont  2008 , p. 299, in Schabas and Wennerlind, p. 283). 
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help them to help themselves” or “for setting up the needy in business where there 
was a prospect of self-support” (Cowherd  1960 , p. 336) was an integral part of his 
proposed Bill. 
 Pitt’s proposed reform was so far-reaching that it raised a general alarm. He with-
drew it, realizing that an across-the-board legislative obstruction would have made it 
impossible for the Bill to pass in any case. His supporters, however, were able to pass 
the Bill piecemeal over the following years. What is of interest for our discussion is the 
infl uence Adam Smith’s  Wealth of Nations had on both Whitbread and Pitt. Whitbread 
argued that Smith had implied a sort of regulation in favor of the working poor as well 
as a plea for high wages. Pitt evoked Smith’s support in arguing for the elimination of 
restrictions on the free circulation of the unemployed workforce (Rothschild  1992 , 
p. 84; McLean  2006 , pp. 90–91). Above all, in his Bill, Pitt adopted Smith’s idea that 
poverty should not only be relieved, but—possibly more importantly—be prevented 
(Sen  2010 , p. 50). As Pitt put it: “The law which prohibits giving relief where any 
visible property remains should be withdrawn; no temporary occurrence should force 
a British subject to part with the last shilling of his little capital, and compel him to 
descend to a state of wretchedness from which he could never recover, merely that he 
might be entitled to a casual supply” (Pitt’s speech 1796, in Eden 1797, p. cccxii). 
 Another admirer of Smith’s, Thomas Paine (1737–1809), proposed a scheme for 
greater economic security of the lower ranks of society. Paine’s reasoning echoed 
Smith’s optimism on social and economic security within a system of natural liberty 
(Himmelfarb  1984 , p. 88).  28  Both saw poverty as the result of external circumstances. 
More specifi cally, Paine viewed poverty and inequality as by-products of mis-govern-
ment and the rapaciousness of landowners who expropriated the common land from 
the poor (Paine [1791] 2003, p. 274). In  The Rights of Man , he advocated abolishing the 
Poor Laws and replacing them with a non-contributory social insurance scheme in the 
form of pensions for the elderly and endowments for motherhood. Thus, Paine believed 
large-scale poverty was neither deserved nor inevitable. His proposals were fi rmly 
grounded in justice and rights rather than need or charity: “But it is justice, and not 
charity, that is the principle of the plan” (ibid., p. 376). He further added that relief to 
the poor was “not of the nature of charity, but of a right” (ibid., p. 235). 
 In a pamphlet written in 1795 and published in 1797, Paine went a step further and 
stated that the monetary economy had transformed land from its original condition to a 
commodity. Against Locke, Paine argued that land had been illegitimately subtracted 
from the natural owners without indemnifi cation (Paine [1797] 2003, p. 375). Thus, each 
landowner “owes to the community a ground-rent (for I know of no better term to express 
the idea) for the land which he holds; and it is from this ground-rent that the fund pro-
posed in this plan is to issue” (ibid., p. 374). Raised by a 10% tax on inherited property, 
the ground rent would have funded the payment of fi fteen pounds sterling to every mem-
ber of the community who had “arrived at the age of twenty-one years.” He further called 
for the payment of “ten pounds per annum, during life, to every person now living, of the 
age of fi fty years, and to all others as they shall arrive at that age” (ibid., p. 376). 
 Paine’s proposal for improving the standard of living of the poor was congruent 
with Smith’s idea that overall social well-being entailed extensive consumption 
 
28
 Paine advocated welfare provisions within a well-functioning market society. 
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opportunities for all of society’s members. He reformulated this approach on the basis 
of an equal birthright to land and natural resources, which, in turn, implied the right of 
the holder to an equal share of the original value of the uncultivated land (Cunliffe and 
Erreygers  2004 , p. 10). This equal share was considered an unconditional cash endow-
ment for all adults. For Paine, the proposal of providing basic capital could be inter-
preted as going much further than calling for outdoor relief in the form of monetary 
grants. Rather, the way in which he penned it suggests that he was consciously pro-
posing a negative income tax, a way of subsidizing the poor through state interven-
tion.  29  Interesting for the present discussion is that Paine’s rights-based approach 
closely resembles the one adopted by Pitt when he defended children’s allowances 
as a “matter of right and honour instead of a ground of opprobrium and contempt” 
(Pitt 1796, in Eden 1797, p. cccxi). Ailsa McKay comments that Paine’s proposal of 
state provision for a minimum income based on general taxation closely resembles the 
rationale supporting the Speenhamland system (McKay  2005 , p. 112). This comment 
is also supported by Donald McCloskey, who argued that relief in aid of wage was in 
effect a negative income tax “with a 100 per-cent marginal rate of tax on earned income 
below the minimum” (McCloskey  1973 , p. 434). 
 V.  FRIENDLY SOCIETIES 
 It was in the above context that another major reform would play a fundamental 
role in the demise of workhouses. In 1793, Parliament decided to fi nancially sustain 
Friendly Societies and their insurance schemes. Proposals aimed at establishing a 
nationwide Friendly Society can be dated back to roughly a century before Parliament 
passed the Rose Act in 1793 (Becher  1826 , p. 3; Poynter  1969 , p. 117; Clark  2000 , p. 4). 
However, it was only late in the eighteenth century that these organizations began to 
be increasingly perceived as the solution “for the dependence of the labouring popula-
tion on the Poor Law” (Poynter  1969 , p. 115). Eden was among those who believed 
that the benefi ts obtained in return for contributing to the Friendly Society’s fund 
allowed the laboring poor not to resort to parish relief there. He plainly recognized that 
he did “not fi nd … that any parish has been burthened with the maintenance of a mem-
ber of any Friendly Society; nor are the instances numerous of families of members 
becoming chargeable” (Eden  1801 , pp. 10–11).  30  
 There were other motivations in favor of Friendly Societies. Some believed that 
in the new industrial environment, with larger trade cycles, Friendly Societies should 
serve as buffers for the laboring poor (Smelser  1959 , pp. 346–353). Others found that 
their members were “less likely to be incited to insurrections and disturbances 
than those having no communication with any class of men superior to themselves, 
are easily led on to those riotous proceedings which are a scandal to good government” 
 
29
 This concept would gain momentum in the second part of the twentieth century, thanks to the three pro-
posals of Milton Friedman. 
 
30
 Such an uncompromising attitude towards Friendly Societies remained one of Eden’s basic tenets. He 
championed the provision of insurance by Friendly Societies as superior to any state-administered scheme 
for helping the ‘laboring classes’ overcome the calamities of life in both  Observation on Friendly Society 
(1801) and  On the Policy and Expediency of Granting Insurance Charters (1806). 
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(Ruggles 1793, II, p. 5). Still others believed that Friendly Societies not only educated 
the poor to habits of savings, self-respect, and self-provision, but also gave them “an 
interest, a stake in preserving, manufacturing, and defending the laws and constitution 
of the country” (Colquhoun  1806 , p. 137). 
 Defoe’s social confi guration was resumed with a seminal essay by one of Smith’s 
admirers, the mathematician Richard Price (1771). He was aware that an ideal social 
confi guration presupposed a high degree of cooperation in civil society. Price’s idea 
was that “one could use his youth and health as a present asset that could offset the 
future liability posed by sickness and age” (Ismay  2010 , p. 30). Later on, in 1789, 
he produced generally applicable tables of contributions and benefi ts for Friendly 
Societies (Gosden  1961 , p. 3). In 1772, Price’s fellow mathematician Frencis Maseres 
(1731–1824) elaborated a scheme where laborers in the manufacturing districts could 
purchase an annuity to secure themselves against indigence in old age. He presented 
his parish-based annuity scheme as “a natural piece of prudence” because the poor 
“might save, in some safe and easy method that would procure them a suitable advan-
tage from it in the latter periods of their lives” (Maseres 1772, p. 5). 
 Three other seminal proposals were made in 1786. Pushed by his success in 1782, 
Gilbert promoted the establishment of a nationwide Friendly Society. Following his 
eminent predecessors, he argued that these associations would encourage “sobriety, 
labour, and industry” (Gilbert 1786, p. 18). Furthermore, he stated that “if the clubs 
and friendly societies which abound in all parts of the kingdom, particularly in 
manufacturing and populous places, are promoted, and a proper encouragement given 
to their benevolent designs; … an entire new face will be given to the concerns of the 
poor” (ibid., p. 46). 
 The clergyman John Acland (1699–1796) expanded on Price’s and Maseres’s insur-
ance schemes and proposed a nationwide Friendly Society that would receive weekly 
contributions from wage-earners and landowners alike to supply various benefi ts. 
Even if Acland’s scheme was exceedingly ambitious to gain legislative support, it was 
relevant in changing the general opinion on poverty. It treated poverty as a social prob-
lem that could be dealt with successfully only “if everyone would play a role in its 
solution” (Ismay  2010 , p. 33). Acland believed that rich and poor alike had liabilities; 
thus, both should contribute to the society’s fund (Acland 1786, pp. 10–11). The pro-
posal acknowledged that while each member of the parish “carried comparable liabil-
ities, not everyone had the same ability to pay for them” (Ismay  2010 , p. 33). If the 
money collected by each society were to be invested in national public securities, the 
interest earned on these securities would be enough to bridge the gap for those who 
were not in a position to contribute. Acland maintained that those who snubbed the 
society’s fund deserved no mercy (Acland 1786, p. 42). 
 One of the fi ercer opponents to Thomas Gilbert’s parliamentary disputes was Joseph 
Townsend. In his  Dissertation on the Poor Law (1786), he maintained that the existing 
system of poor relief discouraged virtue, hard work, and obedience;  31  but his proposal 
did not intend to leave the poor destitute. In his view, the Poor Laws should be disman-
tled gradually, in conjunction with the establishment of mandatory Friendly Societies. 
 
31
 Townsend’s abolitionist ideas, based on the replacement of the Poor Laws by private charity, would be 
developed by Thomas Malthus in his  Essay on Population (1798). 
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If not married, the laborer was to contribute a quarter of his wages; if married, “not 
more than one thirtieth of his income” (Townsend 1786, p. 99). In order “to drive them 
into these societies, no man should be entitled to relief from the parochial fund who 
did not belong to one of these” (ibid., p. 99). 
 A year later, John Rolle (1750–1842) proposed a large-scale allocation of funds to 
Friendly Societies. Speaking “at the express desire of his constituents,” who feared a 
rate increase, Rolle proposed a social insurance scheme fi nanced by both employers 
and employed workers. There would be “one general club or fund throughout the 
kingdom, with permanency to the body and security to the capital ... to be raised by 
obliging the rich in a certain limited proportion to become contributors to the benefi t 
of the poor, and to oblige the poor, whilst young and in health, to contribute towards 
their own support when disabled by sickness, accident, or age” (Rolle 1787, in Namier 
and Brooke  1964 , p. 183). Parliament rejected the proposal, not heeding Rolle’s 
assurances to the House of Commons that his proposal for a universal benefi t society 
“would reduce expenditures for the poor, relieve distress, give a spur to industry, and 
encourage population” (Cobbett  1818 , p. 1062). 
 In 1793, Parliament passed the Act for the Encouragement and Relief of Friendly 
Societies, better known as the Rose Act. It was designed to protect and encourage 
Friendly Societies “in the raising of funds voluntarily for the mutual relief and 
maintenance of members in sickness, old age, and infi rmity” (Cowherd  1960 , p. 333). 
George Rose (1744–1818) thus succeeded where previous attempts had failed. Rose’s 
success suggests that, by the end of the eighteenth century, British society had come to 
realize that the fi ght against poverty could not be won by allowing market rules to 
dominate or by allowing the state to take over the economy. The fi ght could be won 
only in a mixed economy where state, market, and civil society play complementary 
roles. Rose was quite optimistic with regard to the industriousness of the Friendly 
Societies’ members. His Act unambiguously stated that they were necessarily indus-
trious, as they had worked hard enough to save the money needed to become a member. 
This demonstrated their willingness to work, which rendered them unlikely to become 
‘chargeable.’ Rather than asking assistance from the parish during hard times, a mem-
ber of a society would go to his club to receive assistance. 
 The Rose Act was able to overshadow the fl urry of complaints advanced against 
Friendly Societies, which spanned from the continuous increase of the contribution 
rates to the societies’ failure in managing their savings. The Act expressed the view that 
the introduction of voluntary “separate funds for the mutual relief and maintenance of 
the said member in sickness, old age, and infi rmity, is likely to be attended with very 
benefi cial effects, by promoting the happiness of individuals, and at the same time 
diminishing the public burthens” (33  Geo . III. c. 54). While not a revolutionary reform, 
the Rose Act “cemented friendly societies solidly in the social structure of the working 
class” (Smelser  1959 , p. 356).  32  
 Rose’s Act rested upon a solid rationale. He was conscious of the speed at which 
industry was expanding and producing an increasing demand for labor, especially 
in wealthy districts and towns (Vernon-Harcourt  1860 , p. 525). In order to help the 
 
32
 Rose was also concerned with providing the working population with “the banking facilities open to 
businessmen and landowners” (Cooke  1950 , p. 116). 
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laboring poor to move to where job opportunities were greater, he established that 
“[n]o member of a  Friendly Society was to be removed from any parish until he should 
become actually chargeable” (33  Geo . III. c. 54). The success of this piece of legisla-
tion was remarkable: “as long as friendly societies promised to guarantee for its own, 
as long as they kept its members from making demands on the parish, individuals 
could live peacefully outside their parish of origin” (Kowaleski 2000, p. 53). 
 The effectiveness of Friendly Societies under the Rose Act has been documented by 
Eden. According to Eden’s estimate, the total membership of the societies in 1801 was 
astronomic: 5,117 local clubs were registered. To this number, one should add all those 
who did not register, bringing the total roughly to 7,200 societies. Making the due 
calculations, he concluded that at the turn of the century, there were at least 648,800 
members. Three years later, the total membership for England and Wales reached 
the astronomical fi gure of 704,350 (Eden  1801 , pp. 6–8). Eden’s appreciation of the 
Friendly Societies derived from his preoccupation that the Poor Laws were “costly 
beyond all calculations” (Eden 1797, p. xvii). His disaffection towards workhouse 
schemes was based on solid economic reasoning. Public provisions to provide work 
for the able-bodied, he claimed, “proceeded from the supposed existence of facts in 
political economy, which was doubtful at the time, but which experience had since 
proven to be mistaken. It is a most satisfying circumstance … to show that the capital 
stock of the public cannot enter into competition with the capital and well-exerted 
industry of Individuals” (Eden 1797, I, pp. 481 and 586). Eden’s conclusion was 
straightforward: such a misconception could be eradicated only by substituting 
“voluntary charity and self-help for the Poor Law” (Cowherd  1960 , p. 338). 
 Eden’s argument for the amendment of the Act of Settlement and Removal was 
exquisitely Smithian. He situated a man’s wealth in his own labor. He shared Smith’s 
premise that the “patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his 
hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner 
he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour is a plain violation of this most sacred 
property” (Smith [1776] 1976, p. 129), and believed that strict residence requirements 
constituted such a violation. In Eden’s works, the mobility of the laboring poor was 
not volatile fl uidity, but a potent source of labor, which, like capital itself, must be 
free to fl ow. 
 With regard to the above refl ections on Friendly Societies, what is worth noticing is 
that Smith’s idea of preventing, rather than relieving, poverty remained prevalent 
in the writings of all the reformers. It also remained congruent with Smith’s idea that 
“the interests of all would be best served, … within a social order run by … individuals 
acting in mutual concert, seeking to improve their lives through that combination of 
rivalry, co-operation and emulation that typifi es liberty at its best,” and guided by “a 
sense of duty to others and aware that their personal contribution to upholding moral 
rules counted” (Green  1999 , pp. 18–19). Friendly Societies were the best examples 
of this tradition. Membership in a Friendly Society protected the laboring class from 
risks to which they were particularly exposed: unemployment, industrial accidents, 
sickness, and so forth. The voluntary contributions to the Friendly Societies also made 
the laboring class less likely to resort to parish resources (Eden  1801 , pp. 10–11). In 
combination with the modifi cations to the 1662 Act and widespread allowances, 
Friendly Societies weakened the mobility restriction imposed upon the working poor, 
improving their chances of fi nding an occupation. 
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 In the shift from a static economy, based on farming, trade, and the cottage industry, 
to a more dynamic one dominated by the large-scale production of consumer goods, 
workhouses were no longer the preferred institution for dealing with poverty. 
 VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 We have tried to show how a new concept of economic development proposed 
from the 1730s, by a minority strand of authors like Vanderlint, Berkeley, Tucker, 
Postlethwayt, and, later, Hume and Smith, paved the way to a more profound under-
standing of the role of the poor within society. 
 The round of reforms that occurred in the last quarter of the eighteenth century 
brought about the demise of the workhouse system and its partial replacement with 
wider redistributive schemes, based on both general taxation and private funds. The 
Speenhamland system falls in the category of general taxation, which could be inter-
preted as a sort of negative income tax; while civil society associations like the Friendly 
Societies fall in the category of private insurance schemes , which were meant not only 
to reinforce self-discipline and social cohesion among the laboring poor, but also offer 
an effective shelter against the risk and uncertainty that poverty entailed. Both schemes 
can be seen as a qualitative response to social change from an economic system geared 
around custom to one rooted in competition. 
 Furthermore, it must be clearly stated that no direct infl uence between economic 
ideas and social reforms can be derived from the available sources: the economic 
thinkers considered in this paper were neither directly involved in the relevant 
Parliamentary debates nor quoted by those social reformers who actively promoted 
structural amendments to the existing system of poor relief. Moreover, economic 
thinkers did not devote much attention to assessing what measure would best serve the 
purpose of poverty reduction. What can be said, instead, is that the new economic 
ideas, which emerged during the mid-eighteenth century, were part of a more liberal 
and less paternalistic vision of social and economic relationships, and bore important 
consequences also in the fi eld of social legislation. 
 Four parallel and convergent aspects in the development of political economic theory 
and legislative reforms have been identifi ed. First, economic thinkers and reformers 
came to view poverty not as an individual problem, but rather as a social calamity 
associated with the development of the industrial economy that proper institutions 
should aim to address. Apropos, the rejection of the utility of the poor doctrine, as 
developed by the early mercantilist literature (with its corollary of forced labor, repres-
sive controls, and mere survival conditions), was certainly one of the most important 
by-products of the changes that occurred in the realm of political economy. This 
allowed the issue of poverty to receive greater attention, understanding, and answers. 
 Second, both reformers and economic thinkers came to share a more optimistic and 
benign vision of poverty, believing that a substantial improvement of the living condi-
tions of the poor was possible in the context of a more industrious, secure, and open 
society. Hume and Smith especially considered the negative attitude of the poor toward 
work and other deviant behaviors as the consequence of either wages that were too 
low or work that was excessively arduous, rather than attributing it to innate char-
acter defects. They recognized the importance of fair wages as a driving force to 
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human industriousness. That Hume’s plea for higher wages was made on the grounds 
of equality adds additional ethical and political weight to the argument. At the same 
time, social reformers upheld cash-transfer schemes, believing they did not imperil 
economic growth or induce workers to reduce their effort. 
 Third, economic thinkers and social reformers alike believed the workhouse system 
had already delivered dismal results. Concerns regarding the workhouse system had 
been voiced since the mid-seventeenth century (Graunt, John White, Samuel Hatlib) 
and continued throughout the following century (Defoe, Bellers, Braddon, Joseph 
Maisse, John Scott, Henry Zouch, and William Blackstone, among others). The old 
system denied the poor the opportunity of contributing to national prosperity by taking 
a consistently punitive stance toward the able-bodied poor and exploiting their labor in 
exchange for less than a subsistence level. This vision converged with the proposals of 
those social reformers who urged Parliament to shut down workhouses, increase labor-
force mobility, extend outdoor relief, and encourage Friendly Society insurance 
schemes. 
 Fourth, economic thinkers and social reformers shared the same understanding 
of the state’s duties towards the lower ranks of society. Both the unemployed and 
the laboring poor should be protected from excessive hardship, especially in times of 
increasing prices. Economic writers suggested that keeping the vast majority of the 
population in poverty hindered national economic growth by underlining that within a 
fl ourishing society, consumption, productivity, and wages ought to increase simulta-
neously. Letting the laboring poor take part in the benefi ts generated by economic 
growth would help widen the potential for further economic progress. 
 On the whole, the new ideas that emerged within the late mercantilist and Classical 
economic literature contributed to establishing the cultural milieu within which social 
reformers made their case for new social legislation aimed at securing higher living 
standards for the poor. While the rationale for reforming social policy in the last quar-
ter of the eighteenth century basically rested on a wide range of political and social 
concerns, it certainly gained force from the widespread belief that the introduction of 
public standards of fairness and extensive support to the laboring poor was not incon-
sistent with the requirements of a growing and rapidly changing economy. 
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